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Globalization, Social Movements, and the Construction of Europe: The Example of the 
European Parliament Elections in France 
 
 
  Though social scientists have lately devoted themselves to the study of globalization 
(Waters 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1999), most of these studies have concentrated on its 
economic and social consequences. Globalization is often seen as a fundamentally unjust 
process that causes confusion and destroys more than it creates. In many areas, the 
substantive implications of globalization are left untouched. In this paper, I examine the link 
between regional integration in Western Europe and the transformation of domestic politics 
through the example of the European Parliament elections. I argue that globalization through 
European integration is having a significant impact on French domestic politics. More 
precisely, the elections to the European Parliament, a supranational political institution, have 
contributed to the political mobilization of traditionally voiceless groups such as the 
unemployed and to the introduction into public discussion of new issues tied to Europe, 
transforming political culture and the relationship between national politics and multinational 
bargaining (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990, 295).    
According to numerous studies, the European Parliament is a marginal institution in 
all the fifteen member states of the European Union, and the political values it represents are 
dominated values on the domestic scales determining political activity and judgment (Reif 
1997, 115-124). Consequently, many political scientists consider the European Parliament 
elections are second order elections compared to presidential or other national elections (Reif   
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& Schmitt 1980, 3-44; Eick and Franklin 1996). However, from the point of view of domestic 
politics, these elections are by no means secondary. They have multiple effects on 
Europeanized domestic political systems (Christensen 1994). The European Parliament 
elections function as a social laboratory where parties, currents, and social movements can 
test new ideas, present new candidates, and challenge established political practices. Precisely 
because in France the European Parliament elections are considered less important than the 
elections to the lower chamber, the National Assembly, politicians see in them an opportunity 
to take risks and experiment with a lower price to pay for failure. Because the elections to the 
European Parliament serve as an occasion to innovate, they give us a glimpse of what French 
politics might be in the future, revealing social trends that would otherwise remain hidden. 
Furthermore, the elections to the European Parliament provide a public space where ideas 
relative to Europe can be developed. 
Joining the European Community or Union is a significant event for a country 
because it raises the number of elected national officials. In France, for example, the rise in 
1979 was on the order of 10 percent. Concretely this means that these new five-year posts 
become objects of struggle between political parties, currents inside these parties, and, 
because of the rules of competition, various protest movements exterior to party politics. One 
of the structural effects of European integration has been that each member state of the 
European Union has to send representatives to the European Parliament. An extra-territorial 
institution based in Brussels that holds meetings once a month in Strasbourg, France, thereby 
becomes an integral part of domestic politics in all European Union countries. At the same 
time, a new political type is born: the elected transnational politician, half-politician and half-
”elected diplomat”, a hybrid of international politician, national elected official, and cultural 
emissary.  
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As a consequence of the transformation, the size and structure, of the Europeanized 
political systems, new political issues tied to European political representation have been 
introduced into national political debates, creating confusion and uncertainty. What should 
the MEP’s (Member of the European Parliament) role in domestic politics be? Should 
national political leaders be present in the European Parliament, or should they restrict their 
activities to national parliaments? What criteria should parties use to select their candidates 
for European Parliament elections? Should the candidates be Europeans, experts, regional 
representatives, or solely the representatives of political parties? 
The elections to the European Parliament present at least two general characteristics. 
First, in all European Union countries, the post of MEP is less valued than other elected 
national representatives or deputies. In France, MEPs do not have the educational 
characteristics that correlate with positions of political power. As the European Parliament is 
situated in a relatively unstable zone compared to national institutions such as the National 
Assembly, the percentage of MEPs resigning from their posts in mid-term is higher than for 
other national posts. For instance, between 1989 and 1994, 36 percent of French MEPs 
abandoned their mandates in mid-term (Kauppi 1996, 1-24). Of the 87 French MEPs elected 
in 1994, only 69 (80 percent) were still MEPs in 1999: 18 of them (20 percent) had been 
appointed ministers in Lionel Jospin’s Socialist government in 1997 or had switched to local 
politics. Also, at each election to the European Parliament, the proportion of new MEPs is 
much higher than that of incumbents. In 1994, only 32 percent of MEPs renewed their 
positions. In comparison, in 1997 48 percent of deputies renewed their positions. French 
MEP Fabre-Aubespry echoed a general view among French politicians when he said he 
would have no hesitations about choosing the National Assembly over of the European 
Parliament (Beauvallet 1998, 30).  
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Second, the level of abstention is much higher in European Parliament elections than 
in national or local elections. In France, the abstention rate fluctuated between 39 percent and 
53 percent. The sociological characteristics of the voters partly explain this lower turnout. 
Voters interested in European affairs are well educated and well off. According to a study 
conducted in Nantes, France, by Martine Chadron, Charles Suaud, and Yves Tertrais, 45 
percent of Nantians are already familiar with Europe because of their work. 59 percent of 
these are senior managers (cadres supérieurs) (Chadron et al. 1991, 34-46). This 
overrepresentation of the middle- and upper-classes is also visible in the European 
Parliament, although not to the same extent as in the National Assembly (Birnbaum 1985). 
In France, the deputies are more socially and politically an elite than are the MEPs. 
Traditionally they have more often held simultaneous positions in the political system than 
MEPs. For instance in 1988 96 percent of deputies held local offices. For MEPs the average 
was 71 percent  in 1994. Differences in the modes of election partly explain this. In the 
parliamentary elections a two-round majority system guarantees that the main political parties 
get the most votes. In contrast, the proportional system used in the European elections 
favours the smaller parties and various ad hoc political constellations, including social 
movements.  
As the European Parliament has gained power in the 1990s, the hostility of national 
deputies toward it has grown. Tensions have developed. For some deputies, MEPs are not 
real politicians because they do not have a constituency to nurture. They do not have to spend 
their Sundays at fairs and markets meeting their electors. Because of their extra-territorial 
status, MEPs suffer from collective split personality disorder, and a general sense of 
inferiority vis-à-vis national politicians. This sense of inferiority is coupled with a reputation 
in their home countries for being untouchable, unaccountable, and irresponsible. While  
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feeling detached from “real” politics, MEPs have a sense of being part of a great adventure 
and historical mission, constructing the architecture of the future, a Europe of the 21
st century 
(Abélès 1992). This forward-looking outlook legitimizes, in their eyes, their present political 
illegitimacy and stigma in an institution, the European Parliament, in which the relative 
absence of traditional political partisan divisions enables intra-party cooperation and political 
discussion. 
 
The rules of political competition 
 
In contrast to other European Union countries that are divided into several regional districts 
for the elections to the European Parliament, France comprises one national electoral district. 
As a result, national representation is emphasized over regional or local representation. In a 
single voting district, the national media plays a decisive role and nationally known 
individuals have an advantage. Proportional representation structures political competition 
differently in the elections to the European Parliament than the two-round majority system 
used in elections to the National Assembly. Proportional representation means that seats are 
distributed according to the votes a list receives. Moreover, in France, there is no preferential 
voting system as in countries such as Finland and thus votes go to lists and not to individuals. 
The political parties, coalitions, or movements set the priorities and rank the candidates 
representing various interests. For instance, in the 1999 European elections the 
Rassemblement pour la République-Démocratie libérale-Génération écologie (RPR-DL-GE) 
-list ”L’Europe pour la France” led by Nicolas Sarkozy and Alain Madelin included 
representatives of different wings of these three parties, from the followers of President 
Jacques Chirac to supporters of former Speaker of the National Assembly Philippe Séguin,  
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former Prime Minister Alain Juppé, and various public figures, regional representatives, 
women politicians, and so on. 
In France proportional lists are used with a 5 percent threshold. If a list does not get 5 
percent of the total votes, it gets no seats. In preventing the smallest coalitions from being 
represented this threshold hinders the excessive splitting of the political spectrum. However, 
the 5 percent threshold was not enough for Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. In 1998, 
Jospin tried to transform the proportional system into a de facto majority system by proposing 
a 10 percent threshold for the European elections, and division into several districts instead of 
a single one (Le Monde 1998, 44-45). Surprisingly, Gaullist President Chirac backed Socialist 
Prime Minister Jospin in these efforts. Both Jospin and Chirac wanted to eliminate the 
smaller parties with representation between 5 and 10 percent, like the French Communist 
Party and especially the extreme rightist Front National (FN) led by Jean-Marie Le Pen. They 
hoped that as a result of these measures the French party system would be divided into two 
hegemonic blocks led by Jospin and Chirac. The proposal met fierce resistance not only from 
the smaller parties but also from the leaders of various currents in the larger parties. 
Especially vocal about their opposition to any reforms were the small parties on the left, the 
Verts, the Communistes, and Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Mouvement des citoyens (MDC) 
(Graham 1998). Because of this resistance, Chirac and Jospin abandoned the reform, at least 
for the moment. 
In their reform attempt, Chirac and Jospin were motivated partly by narrow partisan 
interest in strengthening their positions on the left and the right and partly by national 
concern over French influence in the European Union. By renovating the rules of competition 
in the European elections, Chirac and Jospin were trying to consolidate their camps, increase 
their control over the content of political debates, and prepare the ground for the political  
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battle that will culminate in the presidential elections of 2002. Jospin’s proposal would have 
cut up the country up into eight super-regions or “regional baronies” that would have 
transformed the national campaigns into regional campaigns. The reform would have done 
away with the possibility of plurality of posts (cumul des mandats), that is, of holding two or 
more local or national elected offices simultaneously (Mény 1987, 230). An electoral law 
restricting plurality of posts was eventually passed. According to Article L46-1 of this law, 
“no one can accumulate more than two electoral mandates.” Electoral mandates include those 
of French parliamentarian, European deputy, regional or general councillor, and mayor of a 
town of more than 20 000 inhabitants. 
Chirac backed Jospin’s reform because of the results of the 1998 regional elections, in 
which the Front National won numerous seats with the assistance of Gaullist politicians and 
five Gaullist presidents of regions were elected with the help of Front National voters. 
Jospin’s proposal would have eliminated any hopes of small parties being represented. For 
instance, under the reform, the Center district of France (roughly the area of the Massif 
Central) were allotted six MEPs, to be represented in this geographical area a list would need 
to receive get at least 16.66 per cent of all the votes (100 divided by 6 seats). De facto this 
would mean that small parties such as the Verts, the Parti communiste français (PCF), the 
Front National, or protest movements such as Lutte ouvrière (LO) would be left without a 
political voice in the Center district. 
Chirac and Jospin’s second motive for transforming the rules of competition was 
France’s influence in the European Union. Because there were so many French lists (in 1999 
nine lists were represented), French MEPs are scattered across the European Parliament in a 
number of small political groups. As a result, their influence is quite modest (Pitette 1998). 
This influence is further weakened by the system of plurality of posts. Because as a rule  
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French MEPs hold other national and regional positions, they are often absent when 
important decisions are made in the European Parliament. An MEP described the effects of 
this French absenteeism and how political opponents used it to their advantage: 
Friday was the ideal day for passing a resolution in Strasbourg which was 
unfavorable to France. Half, even three-fourths of the French representatives 
had already returned to their electoral districts, to make an appearance on 
market day or give out medals. (Druon 1998)
1 
 
One of the effects of French absenteeism has been an increase in French MEPs’ hostility 
toward the European Parliament. Because decisions are made to which French MEPs do not 
contribute and to which they are sometimes opposed, they feel they can criticize the 
institution they are supposed to represent. Thus, they contribute to the delegitimization of the 
Union and its institutions. 
Another effect of Jospin’s reform would have been tighter executive control over the 
French debate on Europe. By regionalizing campaigns, Jospin and Chirac would have 
regionalized the debate and reinforced their control over national priorities. Consequently, the 
grip the two have over the national political agenda would have tightened. The risk the 
reform presented for Jospin and Chirac was that by promoting a German-style France of the 
länder they might create regional baronies or regional super-representatives who would have 
real legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies and might challenge national decision 
makers - currently the real electors of French MEPs. 
 
                                                 
1 “Le vendredi est le jour idéal pour faire passer à Strasbourg une résolution qui nous 
était défavorable.  La moitié, sinon les trois quarts, des représentants français étaient 
retournés dans leur fief électoral, pour se montrer sur les marchés ou remettre des médailles.”  
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The revolt of the underdogs 
 
For political groups that are in the minority or that represent non-party interests, such as the 
various protest movements, the European elections are a unique opportunity to present their 
message to a national audience and to shape the political agendas of the ruling parties. In the 
elections to the European Parliament in 1999, these protest movements included the Chasse-
Pêche-Nature-Tradition (CNPT) list, representing traditional rural values; a movement of 
minorities and inhabitants of France’s overseas territories; a movement of the unemployed; a 
list composed of candidates from Martinique; and a list demanding lower taxes. Only a few 
such groups could realistically hope to win any seats. In the party political system, the 
elections offer unknown or novice politicians a way to become national figures. Dominique 
Baudis, television journalist and son of Pierre Baudis, mayor of Toulouse, became a national 
political figure after being chosen chief candidate of the RPR-Union pour la démocratie 
française (UDF) list in 1994. He did not stay long in the European Parliament, however. In 
1997, Baudis was elected to the National Assembly and resigned from his post at the 
European Parliament. 
Some regional politicians have seen in the European Parliament a forum for 
promoting regional cultural and economic autonomy vis-à-vis national authorities (Zeller 
1999). In France, women politicians have been over-represented in the European Parliament 
compared to the National Assembly (for details, cf. Kauppi 1999, 329-340). For women 
politicians excluded from the male-dominated Parisian political cliques, the European 
Parliament has presented an avenue of political promotion and an alternative to the National  
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Assembly as a gate of access to national electoral politics. In the 1999 campaign, for the first 
time in French political history, viable candidates of African descent appeared on television 
debates, seeking to mobilize the usually abstentionist minority and partly non-Christian 
electorates. 
The European Parliament elections also present an opportunity for small parties or ad 
hoc lists and movements to apply for public financing for their electoral campaigns. Until 
1995, no laws existed in France concerning the public financing of political parties. To clarify 
the situation and to attempt to control the private financing of parties, the National Assembly 
passed a law. According to this law, if a party or list does not get over 5 percent of the votes, 
its campaign expenses will not be reimbursed from public funds. However, if the party or list 
gets over 5 percent of the votes, the following costs will be covered: the guarantee of 100,000 
French francs the party or list deposited; the official campaign expenses, which can include 
posters, ballot papers, etc., and which can reach as much as FF 20 million; and 50 percent of 
the legal limit (plafond légal), which means the personal funds brought to the campaign by 
the candidates themselves. In 1999, the legal limit was FF 58.8 million; thus, up to FF 29.4 
million could be reimbursed.  
 As French party structures are weak compared to other European party structures and 
European elections are relatively low risk elections, they are an ideal occasion for interparty 
currents to compete and measure their political legitimacy. Often, list leaders are major 
contenders who try to gather followers and shape a team for presidential elections. In the 
hierarchy of elections, the presidential elections are at the top in Fifth Republic France, a 
semi-presidential system where the president is the most powerful political actor (Duverger 
1974). European elections are intermediate elections between big elections like parliamentary 
or presidential elections.  
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The example of Socialist politician Michel Rocard illuminates the social laboratory 
character of the elections to the European Parliament. A major contender for the presidency at 
the beginning of the 1990s, he led the Socialist list in the European elections in 1994. These 
elections offered Rocard an opportunity to test his national popularity. They were a fiasco 
and, as as result, Rocard lost his credibility as a serious presidential contender 
(présidentiable). Gaullist politician Nicolas Sarkozy met the same fate, first in 1992 and 
again in 1999. As a result of these failures, at the end of the 1990s the only serious Socialist 
presidential candidate is Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the only serious Gaullist candidate 
President Jacques Chirac. They are engaged in a race for the presidency. In this race, 
European symbolic legitimacy is as necessary as domestic support. Both Chirac and Jospin 
are eager to present themselves as statesmen of European and not only national caliber. As a 
consequence of this transformation of the context of political action from national to 
European level, language skills and contacts with European and world leaders have become 
political resources. In the French press, Chirac has been praised for his mastery of the English 
language. In May 1999, during a trip to Italy to visit Prime Minister Almeda, Jospin gave his 
speech in Italian. 
For politicians seeking a popular mandate, the political meaning of the elections to the 
European parliament is different in Fifth Republic France than in most other European Union 
countries. In Finland, for instance, a politician cannot concurrently be a MEP and a mayor, 
deputy, or regional councillor. In France, holding a plurality of political posts is the norm. For 
a politician concerned about job security this is an ideal arrangement. And who wouldn’t be 
concerned about it, as most political posts are elected posts and subject to changes in voter 
preference? For a politician, the downside of European representation in Brussels is that it 
relieves him/her of the many duties a deputy or a local politician has to carry out in Paris or in  
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the locality he/she represents. Local political anchoring guarantees the political survival of an 
MEP, as MEP Pierre Bernard-Raymond reminds us. 
 
If I had not presented myself or if I had been beaten at the second municipal 
elections for the mayorship of Gap [small town in the south of France, NK], I 
would have had trouble convincing François Bayrou [leader of the UDF-party, 
NK] to put me on his list. (Beauvallet 1998, 65-66)
2 
  
Local political anchoring is also required for access to high political positions in Paris. In 
French political culture a local position is more valuable than a European one. This is why all 
rising political stars seek local mandates. Even French Commissioner (1994-1999) Yves-
Thibault de Silguy presented himself as a candidate for mayoral elections in the north of 
France. European Commission President Jacques Santer had to intervene and prevent de 
Silguy from running, as local representation was in clear contradiction with European 
representation. Losing a local mandate can also have disastrous effects on careers. For 
instance, in 1995 shortly after being nominated to Alain Juppé’s government, Elisabeth 
Hubert lost the municipal elections. She wasn’t invited to join Juppé’s second government.  
                                                 
2 “Si je ne m’étais pas représenté ou si j’avais été battu à la mairie de Gap aux 
deuxièmes élections municipales, j’aurai du mal pour convaincre François Bayrou de me 
mettre sur la liste.”  
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Apart from the importance of local offices another distinguishing feature of French 
politics is the unusually high number of civil servants running for public office. In most 
European Union countries a civil servant has to resign in order to run for parliament, and 
there is no coming back to his/her former job in the civil service. In France, a civil servant 
can always apply for a temporary leave of absence (détachement) and return, after holding a 
political post, to his/her former position in the civil service. As a civil servant, a would-be 
politician can run a political campaign from his/her office and be paid for it. After losing the 
European elections in 1999, Bruno Mégret and his comrades-in-arms from the alternative 
extreme right party Mouvement national (MN) returned to their ministries to continue their 
civil service careers. It is no accident that the Fifth Republic has been called the civil 
servants’ republic.  
From the point of view of a French career politician who does not have a civil service 
job on which to fall back, the risk involved in running for the European Parliament is less 
than in political cultures where plurality of elected posts is illegal. At the same time, 
however, plurality of posts is a serious obstacle to professionalization of the role of 
Europarliamentarian. As the psychological and professional threshold for running for the 
European Parliament is, relatively speaking, lower than for the National Assembly, the level 
of investment in and seriousness of the campaign will also be lower. In general, a French 
politician’s career will not depend as much on the level of professionalism s/he develops in 
one elected post as on the existence of a comprehensive social safety net composed of 
multiple posts, a network the power of which depends on the politician’s relations with the 
top politicians in intraparty currents. This network also undermines the power of political 
party structures. It is understandable, then, that MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges would equate 
electoral sanction and mentor sanction:   
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The electorate does not exist for a European parliamentarian. Ten people - Mr. 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Mr. Bayrou, Mr. Madelin, and the rest - that’s who 
the electorate is. (Beauvallet 1998, 52)
3 
 
                                                 
3 “L’électorat, ça n’existe pas pour un parlementaire européen. C’est Monsieur Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, Monsieur Bayrou, Monsieur Madelin, voilà oú est l’électorat, c’est dix 
personnes.”  
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For French politicians, relations with party leaders are fundamental for election.
4 The case of 
Michèle Barzat exemplifies the role of currents inside political parties. Elected to the 
European Parliament on the Socialist list in 1979, she took her work very seriously and 
specialized in energy questions. In 1989, however, she was placed 25th on the Socialist list 
led by Laurent Fabius. Without the backing of a major political figure, she was not re-elected. 
Continuity requires entertaining good relations with party bosses. Because of the dominance 
of this executive democracy, in which electors merely confirm a selection made by party 
leaders, MEPs are not necessarily tied to specific interests but rather drift and improvise, as 
their role is not yet codified. As MEP Bourlanges put it: 
 
Well, you’re everybody’s representative and you’re nobody’s. You make 
appearances everywhere, you never know when you should accept an 
invitation or refuse, etc. It really doesn’t matter if I’m actually in my district or 
                                                 
4 Gender parity might change the political game somewhat, as it will be required that 
political leaders list as many women candidates as men candidates.  
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not. (Beauvallet 1998, 52)
5 
 
                                                 
5 “Bah, vous êtes l’élu de tout le monde, vous n’êtes l’élu de personne. Vous vous 
promenez un peu partout, vous ne savez pas très bien s’il faut refuser une invitation ou pas 
etc. Bah, ça ne sert à rien d’être présent ou absent dans mon district.” 
If the European Parliament is a place where members of politically marginal groups can 
acquire political experience, for some politicians it is merely a stepping stone. For ambitious 
young politicians who have all the necessary credentials to make it to the top (Institut 
d’études politiques, École nationale d’administration, ministerial cabinet) (Bourdieu 1996), 
experience in the European Parliament has in the 1990s become a positive addition to a 
political curriculum vitae. Often more experienced politicians close to retirement age will 
also see the European Parliament as a temporary post. According to a senior Finnish 
politician, the European Parliament is for many European politicians an “elephant cemetery.” 
In the French case Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who long harbored hopes of becoming Europe’s 
first President, is an excellent example. For Giscard d’Estaing, representation in the European 
Parliament was more symbolic than political in the traditional sense of the term. More 
generally, MEPs can be divided into “experts,” “novices,” “elephants,” and “tourists” 
depending on their political experience and level of involvement in European affairs. Experts 
like Jean-Louis Bourlanges share with “elephants” a high level of political experience, 
whereas “novices” such as Hélène Carrère-d’Encausse and unknown “tourists” are beginners  
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in political matters. 
 
Table 1. Typology of European Parliamentarians 
Political experience   
High       Low 
 
High    A. Expert      B. Novice 
Investment 
Low    C. Elephant      D. Tourist 
 
The significance of a seat in the European Parliament depends to some extent on the size of 
the country represented and on how long the country has been a member state of the 
European Union. The dilemma of representation - party or country - takes a different form in 
Finland, a small, new EU country, than in France, a relatively large, long-standing EU 
country. The first European elections in Finland in 1996 consisted of two separate elections: 
one of political representatives and one of popular diplomats (Martikainen and Pekonen 
1999). Political representatives were close to party leaders, relying on traditional collective 
political resources. Popularly elected diplomats were media stars, often non-political, and 
with a strong cultural and/or educational background. In contrast to political representatives, 
they were more often women than men, relying on resources that escaped party control. In the 
popular mind, reinforced by political parties seeking to recruit celebrities, it was enough to be 
photogenic and cultured to be a competent Europarliamentarian. Although ski champions and 
television hosts may not as such be competent for the job of MEP, the collective creation of 
such elected cultural “diplomats” testifies to an effort on the part of the electors and the  
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media to define what European competence can be. In France, the influence of cultural 
criteria takes a different form than in some other European Union countries like Finland. 
Traditional party politics in selecting MEPs rule, but pro-Europeanism seems to follow 
cultural rather than traditional political criteria.  
 
The 1999 election programs and campaigns 
 
Since the referendum of 1992 on the Maastricht treaty, the “enjeu européen” has split the 
electorate and become a major political issue in French politics. According to a sociological 
study of the referendum of 1992, of the managers and persons holding a university diploma 
who voted, 70 percent of the former and 71 percent of the latter voted “yes” to France signing 
the Maastricht treaty, while 60 percent of those who voted “no” had a diploma lower than the 
baccalaureate and 58 percent of them were manual workers (Bidégaray and Emeri 1996, 71). 
According to political scientist Pascal Perrineau, inhabitants of towns voted yes, those of 
rural areas no (Perrineau 1996, 45-60). This data seems to indicate that the more educated an 
individual is, the more likely s/he is going to be pro-European. To a large extent, cultural and 
social criteria determine political opinion. 
Europeanization as a complex process of readjustment of whole political systems 
structures not only the French institutional space through new institutions such as the 
European Parliament, but also the space of political discourses. This was particularly visible 
during the European Parliament election campaign of 1999. A clear Europeanization of 
political discourses split the left and the right into federalists and sovereignists, although no 
politician would publicly supported abolition of the nation-state. This split was partly 
produced and reinforced by the media. For the candidates, media visibility determined  
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success. As the war raged in Kosovo, politicians made trips there to show their support, a 
gesture that did not go unnoticed by millions of electors glued to their TV sets during the 
evening news. Nicolas Sarkozy, chief candidate of the RPR-DL list, declared to the press that 
he was going to invent something new every week, “in order to stay a fresh product” 
(Libération 1999).
6 The press printed photos of him with strongmen Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
in Auvergne and Alain Juppé in Aquitaine. Sarkozy’s political tour de France was ironically 
labelled “the magical Sarkozy tour” on “La semaine des guignols” (May 23rd), a satirical 
weekly television show on Canal Plus.  
                                                 
6  “Pour rester un produit frais.” 
To show his backing of François Hollande’s Socialist list, Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin spent his time travelling to meet other Socialist leaders in Rome and Madrid and 
hosted a political meeting at the Palais des Sports in Paris with Tony Blair and Gerhard 
Schröder. Media coverage of the political events and demonstrations ranged from daily radio 
shows like Jean-Pierre Elkabbach’s daily interviews of politicians on “Europe 1" at 8:21 am 
to a special political talk show on Sundays at 6:30, conveniently scheduled just before the 
aperitif, broadcast on LCI’s cable television station and on radio station RTL. Appearing on 
these was a must for any politician. On Channel 1 (TF1), the program “Public” featured a 
special Sarkozy-Hollande debate. Paul Amar’s show “Direct,” on Thursday evenings on 
France 2, and Christine Ockrent’s “Politique Dimanche,” on Sundays, and “France Europe 
Express,” on Thursdays, all on France 3, competed in the notoriety of the politicians they 
succeeded in inviting. The media week was crowned on Sundays by the satirical programs  
 
21
“Le vrai journal” and “Les guignols” on Canal Plus. During the summer of 1999 Canal Plus 
also presented a special program on which every top candidate appeared before the public. 
In order to properly evaluate the political status of the European Parliament elections, 
we must relate them to the long-term strategies of individual political agents and collective 
enterprises. The 1999 campaign was structured by the media presence of the candidates (87 
on each list), the events in Kosovo and on the domestic scene, and the programs on television 
and radio. The elections had many social uses. They presented politicians with an opportunity 
first to test their strength and then to challenge their enemies inside and outside the party, 
either by forcing them to elaborate on their stances on certain issues or by simply discrediting 
them. For the chief candidates, the question they wanted an answer to was, were they 
legitimate presidential contenders (présidentiable)?  
Because the European Parliament elections are national elections but are less 
important than the presidentials, they provide an ideal opportunity to consult the whole 
population and test the relative support of challengers and minority currents. Precisely for this 
reason, the leaders of the political parties are not chief candidates in the European Parliament 
elections. In order to be eligible for the presidency, the grand prize in the French political 
game, a candidate has to have a sizeable base of support and be considered a candidate of the 
highest caliber, which today more than before means of European caliber. 
In 1999 the elections were, as usual, of minor importance but with high stakes, a test 
for all chief candidates. The political challenge for them was to get as many votes as their 
lists had gotten in the previous elections in 1994, which set the standards of success and 
failure. Could Daniel Cohn-Bendit, former student leader of May 1968, deputy mayor of 
Frankfurt am Main, and now chief candidate on the Green list be a player of national 
importance in French politics? To prove that he could be, he had to get at least 10 percent of  
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the votes. Could chief Socialist candidate François Hollande build his political career without 
the explicit backing of Prime Minister Jospin? To prove that he could, he had to attract more 
than 14.49 percent of the voters, Rocard’s result in the 1994 elections. Would François 
Bayrou, president of the centrist UDF and chief candidate of the list “Avec l’Europe, prenons 
une France d’avance” and Alain Madelin, second on the list “L’Union pour l’Europe” led by 
Nicolas Sarkozy, be able to muster enough support for their ideas to present a viable 
alternative to the dominant party on the right, the RPR led by President Chirac? As a 
consequence, might the next French President be from the right but not from the Gaullist 
party? To demonstrate that this was a real possibility in the Spring of 1999, when such a 
proposition was considered unlikely, both Bayrou and Madelin would have needed at least 10 
percent of the votes each. To achieve this goal, they were faced with a choice: join the RPR 
or go solo and get the necessary votes by themselves. 
On the left, Robert Hue might lose his job as Secretary General of the PCF if he didn’t 
succeed in getting as many votes for his list as in the previous elections, 6.91 percent. Could 
he do this with a separate list or should the Communists join the Socialists? The neo-
nationalist and anti-European MDC, led by Jospin’s Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement, which got only 2.3 percent of the votes in 1994, might try to better its score by 
forming a coalition with the Socialist party, with which Chevènement had already started to 
negotiate in the winter of 1998. Another left-wing movement, the Parti républicain de 
gauche (PRG), which succeeded in winning 13 seats in 1994 with Bernard Tapie and a 
different name, Énergie radicale (ER), had no alternative but to join forces with the 
Socialists. The proportional system in fact guaranteed to these smaller parties a certain 
advantage over the bigger parties.  
Due to the war in Kosovo and France’s role in this war, the architecture of a future  
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Europe, immigration policies, a common European defence, and other European issues 
became major political questions that split the political spectrum and turned the torpid 
political campaign into a heated, moral one. The following table presents the chief candidates 
and their stands on the question of European integration. The two dimensions are left-right 
and sovereignist-federalist. 
 
TABLE 2. Europeanism in the campaigns to the European Parliament 
L e f t        R i g h t  
 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Greens,     François Bayrou, UDF
  Federalist  François Hollande, Socialists       Alain Madelin, DL 
(Robert Hue, Communists)      (Nicolas Sarkozy, RPR) 
         
 
(Alain Krivine, LCR),        Charles Pasqua,  
Sovereignist  (Arlette Laguiller, LO)      Philippe de Villiers, RPF 
    Jean-Pierre Chevènement, MDC    Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN,    
Bruno Mégret, MN,    
        J e a n   S a i n t - J o s s e ,   C N P T  
         
 
The leftist federalists were Daniel Cohn-Bendit, First Secretary of the Socialist Party François 
Hollande, and the less openly federalist Communist leader Robert Hue. Dominique Voynet, 
Minister of Environment in Jospin’s government and leader of the Greens, was more critical 
toward Europe than Hue. General Secretary of the Communist party since Georges 
Marchais’s resignation in 1994 and chief candidate of the list “Bouge l’Europe!,” Hue 
combined anti- and pro-European elements in his campaign. Rightist federalists included 
François Bayrou, chief candidate of the “Union de la France” list. Slightly less openly 
federalist was Alain Madelin, leader of  DL and number two on the RPR-DL list, led by 
Nicolas Sarkozy, interim president of the Gaullist party. In April 1999, Sarkozy, more 
ambivalent than Bayrou or Madelin toward Europe, replaced Philippe Séguin, Speaker of the  
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National Assembly, who had resigned from the presidency of the Gaullist party as a protest 
against Jacques Chirac’s policies. 
In view of Chirac’s presidential ambitions, Bernard Pons, president of the association 
“Les amis de Jacques Chirac,” tried to create the broadest possible coalition against the left 
in the European elections of 1999 in view of the presidential elections of 2002. Chirac’s 
support of Jospin’s electoral reform followed this logic. Chirac and Pons wanted to 
collaborate with rightist politicians Pasqua and de Villiers, who formed a common list 
Rassemblement pour la France et l’indépendance de l’Europe (RPF) after Philippe Séguin 
resigned from the head of the RPR-DL-GE list. Philippe Séguin, at this time Speaker of the 
National Assembly and president of the Gaullist party, represented the conservative wing of 
the RPR. He had serious problems with American military dominance in Europe, and could 
not accept France’s minor role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
7 Séguin, a 
notorious anti-European, thought it was possible to conduct the European political campaign 
in 1999 on a purely national program. Like Pasqua, Séguin wanted to save Gaullism from 
Chiracism, that is from its subordination to Chirac’s presidential ambitions. Séguin was ready 
to lead a national list without giving more power to the regions and without collaborating 
with the FN and the centrist UDF. In contrast, Chirac’s political strategy for re-election in 
2002 was to give more power to the regions, ruling by dividing and forming a broad alliance 
on the right that could challenge the leftist presidential candidate, which in 1999 looked like 
it would be Lionel Jospin. 
Among the self-proclaimed sovereignists, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, head of the 
MDC, represented traditional leftist Republicanism and nationalism, building his campaign 
on an anti-European integration platform despite being Minister of Interior in Jospin’s 
                                                 
7 France had rejoined NATO in 1996 through president Chirac’s initiative.   
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government. On the far left, Arlette Laguiller, the only female chief candidate, presidential 
candidate in 1995 and leader of LO, and Alain Krivine, leader of the Lutte communiste 
révolutionnaire (LCR), inherited an anti-establishment posture from the Communist party, 
which had moved toward the center of the political spectrum. On the right among the 
sovereignists Charles Pasqua, former Minister of Interior and co-founder with Jacques Chirac 
of the RPR, and Philippe de Villiers, founder of the Mouvement pour la France party and 
deputy of Vendée, headed the RPF list. On the far right, both Jean-Marie le Pen and Bruno 
Mégret conducted anti-imperialist, anti-American, and anti-European campaigns. 
Extremist parties such as the FN, LO, and LCR resisted European integration in its 
current form, whereas bigger parties closer to the center of the political spectrum were pro-
European. Generally speaking, this same cleavage, big parties for and small against, was 
reproduced in other European Union countries as well, cutting across traditional divisions 
such as left-right and restructuring the space of political ideologies. As a result, parties and 
movements on the extremes of the political spectrum could find common strategic interests 
not only symbolically but also pragmatically at local, national, or supranational levels. For 
instance, Charles Pasqua left the RPR after it was clear that the master of the house was 
Jacques Chirac. For the European elections of 1999, he created his own list on a sovereignist 
platform. He saw that Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s leftist, anti-European MDC had common 
interests with his. Apart from Chevènement’s anti-Europeanism, one position they shared was 
overt opposition to France’s role in the war in Kosovo and to the bombings there. Despite 
these common interests, however, Pasqua did not succeed in creating a left-right coalition. 
Chevènement, who was at this time Minister of the Interior in Jospin’s government, probably 
saw more to gain from a coalition with the Socialists in government and the smaller PRG. 
Why are the large French parties pro-European? First, large political organizations  
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aim at forming governments by themselves or in cooperation with other parties. Second, 
dominant economic and political interests in all EU-countries are pro-European. Once in 
government, party representatives have to collaborate in the context of European Union 
institutions not only with their homologues from other European Union countries in the 
Council of Ministers and other Union institutions, but also with the administration in 
Brussels. From a purely pragmatic point of view, exposing anti-European views is impossible 
in these Europeanized political circumstances. However, it is not impossible to be anti-
European and hold a ministerial position. But Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s activities as 
Minister of the Interior in Jospin’s government and as leader of the anti-European MDC 
illustrate that the constant contradictions between anti-Europeanism and work in a 
government that is by definition pro-European may in the long run diminish political 
legitimacy and permanently damage the political future of the movement. As a rule of thumb, 
at the end of the 1990s in the European polity the higher a political leader is in national 
political hierarchies, the less likely s/he will be anti-European, at least while in government. 
This European cleavage creates for all lists and parties tensions that take various forms and 
that agents resolve with varying degree of success. 
 
 
European of the left and social movements 
 
Splitting the political spectrum, the Kosovo war also had effects on how the campaigns were 
run. It led to confusion as already planned campaigns had to be reorganized. Henceforth, 
political meetings could not be too enthusiastic. The Socialists’ video clip on the theme 
“L’Europe, c’est la paix” had to be cancelled. The Kosovo war also opened the door for  
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intellectual activism that would press the government to face certain issues. The threat of an 
independent list on the “left of the left” (gauche de la gauche) led by sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu was real, forcing, among other things, the Communists, the Socialists, and the 
Greens to seek cooperation with social movements. 
Because of the power of the new European political cleavage for or against Europe 
organisations like Chevènement’s MDC or Robert Hue’s list “Bouge l’Europe!” were caught 
between contradictory ideological and pragmatic political requirements. Ideologically, the 
French Communist Party was against market forces and the creation of a common European 
defense. Pragmatically, as a partner in Jospin’s government, it had to back French war efforts 
in the Balkans and could not openly question Jospin’s efforts to forge a common European 
security structure and to cut public spending and privatize industry. Hue even declared in the 
business daily La Tribune that “the Communists are not the adversaries of the market” and 
that “the Communists have broken with the statist view of things. We are thinking more of a 
system that will enable us to overcome the division between private and public yet mobilize 
both, under the auspices of a new kind of social appropriation which does not exclude the 
private sector” (Le Monde 1999, 7).
8 Consequently, the Communist Party’s strategy for the 
European elections consisted of being pro-market and pro-European for pragmatic reasons 
but also critical of the market and of Europe for ideological and historical reasons. These 
contradictions could not be resolved. For instance, some Communists demanded that Hue 
resign from the government as a protest against the war. According to Hue, resigning would 
have only split the left in two, reinforcing the positions of both Jospin on the left and Chirac 
                                                 
8  “Les communistes ne sont pas les adversaires du marché” ...  “Les communistes ont 
rompu avec une vision étatiste des choses. Nous réfléchissons à un système qui permettrait de 
dépasser la coupure entre le privé et le public en favorisant leur mobilisation commune, sous 
la responsabilité d’une nouvelle appropriation sociale, dont je n’écarte pas évidemment le 
privé”.  
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on the right just before the European elections. Besides, as he put it, “Why resign when you 
can be more effective in the government?”(Virot 1999).
9  
Since Hue’s appointment to head the Communist Party in 1994, he has little by little 
renovated the party’s structure and program. At the beginning of 1999, the party’s main 
newspaper L’Humanité eliminated the hammer and the sickle from its front page. And this 
wasn’t just symbolic politics. L’Humanité declared that it had found a new way of doing 
politics. Its director Pierre Zarka stated bluntly that “L’Huma-new look” had ceased to be the 
Communist Party’s campaign tool and that it would no longer function as a mouthpiece for 
the Communist Party. L’Humanité and the party had adopted a new conception of the 
electorate and the elected, tied more to civil society. The party leadership decided to invest 
big in its European campaign, an opportunity to sound out public opinion and test the 
credibility of its new political line. The Party’s campaign was the costliest of all the 
campaigns, FF 40 million compared to FF 37 million for the Socialist campaign. It consisted 
of 1400 public appearances by politicians in different parts of France. Communist leaders had 
decided to offer bread and circus to attract traditionally passive voters.  
 
                                                 
9 “Pourquoi démissionner quand on est plus efficace dans le gouvernement.”  
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Tonight, at the Cirque d’hiver. The ten artists of the list “Bouge l’Europe!” 
invite everyone (free admission) to the Cirque d’hiver in Paris tonight. You 
want the program? De Graph’ performance by Marko; urban cultures; Fu(rap) 
section; Solo jah Gunt (reggae dub faya) ... Then, for you jazz-lovers, Jean-
Claude Petit; Mélodica; Jazzcogne. Piano solos by André Minvielle and 
Bernard Lubat. And it goes on: Djamel Allam, Farik Berki (hip-hop blues). 
Finally, the crucial moment: “the citizens’ dance-show” ... And along with all 
this, Roger Hanin, Richard Bohringer, “surprise” comrades and the whole 
“Bouge l’Europe!” team. The show starts at 7pm. (L’Humanité June 1, 1999, 
6) 
10 
                                                 
10 “Ce soir au Cirque d’hiver. Les dix artistes de la liste Bouge l’Europe! Invitent tout 
un chacun (entrée gratuite) ce soir au Cirque d’hiver à Paris. Vous voulez le programme? De 
Graph’performance de Marko; Cultures urbaines; Section Fu(rap); Solo jah Gunt (reggae dub 
faya ... Moment zazou ensuite, avec Jean-Claude Petit; Mélodica; Jazzcogne. Moment piano 
solo: André Minvielle, Bernard Lubat. Et ça continue: Djamel Allam, Farik Berki (hip-hop  
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blues). Et enfin, moment crucial: “show-bal citoyen” ... Et avec tout cela Roger Hanin, 
Richard Bohringer, les camarades “surprises” et l’équipe de Bouge l’Europe! Ça commence à 
19 heures.” 
 
The Communist campaign for the European elections was, from the beginning, intended to 
give a fresh, new image of the party. The campaign would appeal to various ethnic groups 
and would be open to “social movements” including the diverse activist labor organizations 
and groups such as the “sans papiers” (persons without immigration papers) and the 
unemployed which had been organizing marches and demonstrations in France’s largest cities 
since 1995. The Communist party no longer wanted to be a militant party. Like the Greens, 
led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the Communist party tried to attract the young and usually 
abstentionist electorate by minimizing traditional politics. In both cases, the campaign for the 
European Parliament was reduced to pop music, cultural celebrities, and buffets. In compiling 
his list of candidates for the European Parliament, Robert Hue also developed the novel idea 
of “double parity”. This meant not only the already popularly accepted parity between men 
and women, but also parity on the list between Communist and non-Communist, professional 
and non-professional candidates. To muster support for the Communist list, Hue was forging 
an alternative to the radical anti-capitalism of Arlette Laguiller and Alain Krivine while  
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responding to the challenge from the Green list using the same methods the Greens were 
using.  
The press published the names of a thousand supporters of Hue’s list. These included 
the wife of former Communist party Secretary General Georges Marchais, Pierre Bergé, CEO 
of the fashion firm Yves Saint Laurent, the Kabyle singer Idir, and the novelist Gilles 
Perrault. The first public meeting of Hue’s list “Bouge l’Europe!” was held in Saint-Ouen, a 
working-class suburb of Paris. In organizing the meeting, the party contacted intellectuals and 
activists in various social movements. Theatre director and “sans papiers” activist Stanislas 
Nordley received a phone call and was asked to join the party’s list. In spite of the fact that he 
was in his own words “sensitive” to the issue of harnessing of the social movement to the 
Communist party, Nordley accepted. Recalling his motives for joining the Communist list, he 
came to the conclusion that “a protest vote on the left or the right is not enough” (Nordley 
1999).
11 Institutions would have to be changed from the inside, and this would take a long 
time. Fodé Scylla, former president of the anti-racist organization SOS-Racisme, legitimized 
his own decision to accept the party’s invitation by citing his desire to bridge the gap that 
separated social reality from the political parties. According to Sylla, the Communist party 
gave its candidates total liberty. Personally, he wanted to defend all those “without” (“les 
sans”) - those without identification papers, those without a home, those without jobs - as 
well as women, who were victims like the unemployed. “For me, the European elections are 
an opportunity to extend my anti-racist struggle” (Sylla 1999a).
12 He was against an “Anglo-
Saxon Europe,” and wanted to talk about concrete issues close to the concerns of ordinary 
                                                 
11 “Un vote protestataire à droite ou à gauche n’est pas suffisant.” 
12  “Pour moi, les élections européennes sont une occasion de prolongement de mon 
combat anti-raciste.”   
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people. “People I meet want to know how they can get dental care” (Scylla 1999b).
13 
According to André Campana, who represented the firm that created it, the video clip 
for the Communist party’s meeting intended to be an ”interface with society” (L’Humanité 
1999).
14 The Communist list provided social movements with a platform where militants and 
human rights activists could meet one another and forge common goals. Like the Green list 
the Communist list also included candidates of color and Muslim candidates in an attempt to 
mobilize at least some of the three million French Muslim voters. For Hue, “this list does not 
make us less Communist, it makes us Communists of the 21st century. If we don’t change 
with society, society will change without us” (Thénard and Virot 1999b, 14).
15 For 
Communist hardliners, however, Hue’s activities examplified sheer opportunism, “a deviation 
                                                 
13 “Les gens que je rencontre veulent savoir comment se faire soigner les dents.” 
14  “Système d’interface avec la société.” 
15 “Cette liste ne nous rend pas moins communistes, mais communistes du XXIe 
siècle. Si nous ne bougeons pas avec la société, la société bougera sans nous.”  
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that will lead to elimination” (Anonymous 1999).
16 
                                                 
16  “Une dérive qui conduit à une liquidation.” 
In their program for the elections, the Communists wanted to reinforce the European 
Parliament and weaken the Commission, especially in the areas of competition and 
commercial policies. The Party supported the institution of the Tobin tax on the movements 
of speculative capital and the elimination of tax paradises sheltering money laundering and 
other illegal financial activities. The Communists called for the creation of a social Europe, 
conversion of all temporary jobs into permanent ones, guarantees of a minimum wage, 
opposition to the relocation of businesses, and shorter working hours without cutting salaries. 
The role of the European Economic and Social Committee was to be strengthened. “Bouge 
l’Europe!” also vowed to develop a common European defense, not in the framework of 
NATO but rather in the one provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).   
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On the extreme left, regional councillor Arlette Laguiller and Alain Krivine 
represented the unemployed and the workers, laboring for “rebirth of a force that will renew 
the revolutionary tradition of the workers’movement” (Bazin 1999, 35).
17 They openly 
criticized the leftist government for not being on the left and for being lackeys of the 
bourgeoisie. Commended by some of their supporters for using “right, simple, natural, and 
plain words” (Forcari 1999, 18),
18 both candidates of the “red left” (la gauche rouge) 
demanded the convocation of a representative congress of the European peoples to constitute 
a New Europe. Like the Communists, they wanted to see more taxation of high income and 
speculative profits. Pacifists, they called for a Europe without wars, ethnic cleansing, or 
intervention by the superpowers. Contrary to Cohn-Bendit’s Greens, LO and LCR were 
against NATO’s bombings in the formerYugoslavia. The privatization of public enterprises 
had to be stopped and new jobs created in hospitals, public transportation, and public 
education. “Companies that make profits of billions of francs and then go and fire their 
workers ... must be requisitioned” (Fabre 1999, 7).
19 The work week should be reduced from 
35 to 30 weeks without cutting salaries. In Laguiller’s own words, if elected, she would 
defend in the European Parliament the interests of Europe’s 18 million unemployed and 50 
million poor people (Laguiller 1999). In a campaign that almost exclusively concentrated on 
unemployment and social exclusion,  Laguiller and Krivine claimed to be not anti-European, 
but rather against a Europe of the market. As in their previous campaigns, Laguiller and 
Krivine assumed the symbolic role that the Communist party had abandoned: that of the 
                                                 
17 “La renaissance d’une force renouant avec la tradition révolutionnaire du 
mouvement ouvrier.” 
18 “Des mots justes et simples, naturels, sans baratins.”  
19 “Les entreprises qui font des milliards de bénéfices et qui licencient malgré tout ... 
doivent être réquisitionnés.”  
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denunciators of those in power. At their public meetings, the International was sung with 
raised fists, recalling the good old days of the revolutionary movement. A retired manual 
worker spoke up at one of these meetings about his motives for voting for Laguiller and 
Krivine, echoing wider sentiments: 
 
Listening to you takes me back to my twenties. With you at least we get down 
to the essentials. Yes, the bosses are still there. Yes, we have to get rid of 
capitalism. Yes, the exploitation is getting worse. Thank you for bringing up 
these obvious facts that seem to escape Robert Hue. (Bazin 1999, 35)
20 
 
                                                 
20 “Quand je vous écoute, je retrouve les accents de mes 20 ans. Avec vous, au moins, 
on ne tourne pas autour du pot. Oui, il y a encore des patrons. Oui, il faut abattre le 
capitalisme. Oui, l’exploitation est de plus en plus rude. Merci d’avoir rappelé ces évidences 
qui échappent pourtant à Robert Hue.” 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit was the most federalist of the chief candidates on the left. His ambition 
was for the Greens to become the strongest party on the left, after the Socialists and before 
the Communists. In their program, the Greens promoted qualified majority voting in the 
Council of Ministers and the elaboration of a European constitution. The European Union 
also needed a constitutional court, a Senate where the regions and various peoples of the  
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Union would be represented, and a stronger European Parliament that would foster links with 
European civil society. The Greens called for harmonization of taxes in Europe and 
elimination of tax paradises. Taxation should be more just and ecological. The French 
ecological party also wanted to sponsor a European pollution tax and initiatives of the eco-
development type. Like the Communists and LO-LCR, the Greens were in favor of 
introduction of the Tobin tax on capital movements between the European Union and the rest 
of the world, a levy which would finance an international public fund for codevelopment. The 
Greens were convinced that unemployment rates could be drastically cut by shortening 
working hours without diminishing salaries. Ecologically useful activities had to be furthered 
and a minimum European income equal to the poverty limit had to be instituted. In the long 
term, a pan-European defense system would replace NATO and the WEU. 
Close to Cohn-Bendit in level of pro-European sentiment was François Hollande, first 
secretary of the Socialist party which represented the governmental majority and whose 
slogan was “Construisons notre Europe”. According to Hollande the Socialists, who had 
created a common list with Chevènement’s MDC and the PRG for the European elections, 
wanted a modern Europe that would take into account social,  employment, and defense 
issues. 
 
Our objective is to promote political Europe through the extension of qualified 
majority voting, to further creation of a European defense system, and to jump 
start the Europe of citizens and jobs. (Hollande 1999, 13)
21 
 
                                                 
21 “Notre objectif est en fait de faire progresser l’Europe politique avec l’extension du 
vote à la majorité qualifiée, de faire avancer l’Europe de la défense et de donner un coup 
d’accélérateur à l’Europe de l’emploi ainsi qu’à l’Europe sociale.”  
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 Because of the anti-Europeanism of Chevènement’s MDC, the Socialists replaced the initial 
formulation “federation of nation-states” in their program with the more neutral “a union of 
nations and peoples freely agreed upon in mutual respect and the interest of all concerned” (Le 
Monde 1999, 9).
22 The Socialists wanted a European Constitution and the extension of 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers, increased collegial responsibility of the European 
Commission, and a wider scope for the Parliament’s codecision-making. In conjunction with 
enlargement of the Union to the east, the Socialist party called for a renovation of European 
Union institutions. The party emphasized that the human rights records of the new member-
states should be closely monitored. Like the Greens, the Socialists supported the idea of 
harmonization of European taxes as well as imposition of a Tobin tax on capital movement 
and abolition of fiscal paradises. The Socialist party also wanted to see the value added tax 
(VAT) on manual labour-intensive economic activities cut. In terms of social  Europe, the 
Socialists pushed for a social treaty of the same breadth and scope as the economic and 
monetary treaties in order to fight social exclusion. In their vision, by 2005 working hours 
would not exceed 35 per week, a minimum salary would be in force, and a mechanism of 
convergence of real salaries would have been instituted.  
                                                 
22 “Fédération d’Etats Nations ... Une union librement consentie de nations et de 
peuples dans le respect de chacun et l’intérêt de tous.” 
To demonstrate the seriousness of his commitment to Europe, Hollande declared to the 
press in March 1999 that he would take his seat in the European Parliament in July after the  
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elections. He wanted to invalidate accusations that the Socialists were not taking the elections 
seriously and that the top candidates would defect from their European seats at the first 
opportunity. Hollande’s declaration also surprised Primer Minister Jospin, who responded by 
saying that Hollande would go to the National Assembly just like all the other first secretaries 
before him. In the party there was no doubt about the priorities despite the party’s pro-
federalism: first came the National Assembly, then the European Parliament. Like previous 
chief candidates Jospin, Fabius, and Rocard, Hollande would have to give precedence to the 
National Assembly. In this way, Jospin confirmed the popular perception that the European 
Parliament was less important than the National Assembly. He also reinforced a kind of 
electoral hypocrisy. If the chief candidate preferred Paris to Brussels and thus did not take the 
elections seriously, why should the electors care about Brussels and vote in the elections? 
Electors voted for the Socialists in the European Parliament elections because they wanted the 
Socialists to represent them in the European Parliament. Instead, largely because of Jospin’s 
pressure, Hollande withdrew his candidature, but only after the votes had been cast. 
 
Visions of Europe on the split right 
 
On the right, the lists that most fully tapped into the public’s anti-European sentiments were  
Pasqua’s and de Villiers’s RPF and the extreme right lists of Jean-Marie le Pen and Bruno 
Mégret, FN and MN, respectively. The RPF, the FN, and the MN represented alternatives for 
the traditional supporters of the RPR, which had turned into a pro-European party after 
Séguin’s resignation from its leadership. Pasqua and de Villiers joined forces after Pasqua 
failed to form a Republican anti-European coalition with Chevènement’s leftist sovereignists. 
According to opinion polls conducted by the BVA Institute on April 2, 1999, nearly two  
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months before the elections, Pasqua would have won  about 4 percent of the votes by himself, 
whereas de Villiers would have received just under 5 percent of the votes. With these scores, 
neither would have surpassed the threshold of 5 percent: joining forces was the only 
alternative.  
At the core of the RPF’s political message were animosity toward Germany, 
glorification of the nation-state, anti-Americanism, and virulent defense of a neo-colbertist 
economic philosophy. Pasqua and de Villiers wanted to reinforce European security by 
developing a common defense without an integrated European defense. NATO had to be 
renovated in order to enable European action to be implemented by the Europeans themselves. 
In their security system, the WEU would become the pillar of the new European defense. 
According to a joint communiqué dated April 9, 1999, NATO had become “Europe’s de facto 
diplomatic, defense, and security organization. We have to change Europe. The European 
Union, which was devised to guarantee peace and the prosperity of European nations, should 
not rely on others in the defense of its interests or its political activity. Independence is the 
condition of Europe’s future and world stability” (Saux 1999, 7).
23 
                                                 
23 “De facto l’organisation de la diplomatie, de la défense et de la sécurité en Europe. 
Il faut changer d’Europe. Conçue pour garantir la paix et assurer la prospérité des nations 
européennes, l’Union européenne ne saurait s’en remettre à d’autres pour défendre ses  
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intérêts ou conduire sa politique. L’indépendance est la condition de l’avenir de l’Europe et 
de l’équilibre mondial.”  
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Both the senator from the Hauts-de-Seine and the deputy from Vendée demanded that 
Europe forge its own defense program, while condemning the European superstate which 
prevented economic growth. They demanded a reduction of the European Union’s structural 
spending. In their eyes, the Union had to stay an association of states, and national legislation 
had to be given the priority over European Union legislation. Consequently, the authority of 
the Council of Ministers had to be superior to that of the European Commission. The 
European Parliament’s power should be restricted to codecision, and the powers of the 
national parliaments should be reinforced. These two institutions, the European Parliament 
and the national parliament, should form the two legislative chambers of the European Union. 
Dismayed by the pace of integration, Pasqua noted that “Treaty after treaty, we create 
independent institutions to which we grant powers that have taken our states centuries to 
conquer” (Pasqua 1999, 23).
24 In accordance with the famous Luxemburg compromise, the 
right of veto of the member-states had to be maintained.  
 Extreme right leaders Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret had a similar discourse to 
Pasqua’s  and de Villiers´s. Playing on the general insecurity and fears about immigration, 
both portrayed Europe as a danger for France. Being pro-European was a crime against 
France. For Le Pen, for instance, Brussels was a Trojan horse in the service of America and 
NATO dominance. In terms of defense policy, both Le Pen and Mégret were partisans of a 
common European defense without the Americans. In economics, national priority had to be 
reinstated and the taxes of small and medium-sized companies drastically cut. National 
preference, which would, according to Le Pen, free France from the fetters of unemployment, 
had to be instituted. Bruno Mégret proposed that the Council of Ministers be replaced by a 
                                                 
24 “Traité après traité, nous installons des organes indépendants auxquels nous 
donnons des pouvoirs que nos Etats nationaux ont mis des siècles à conquérir.”  
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Council of Nations, which would make decisions in unanimity. In this scheme, the 
Commission would be replaced by an administrative secretariat, and both the Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice would become mere consultative bodies. 
Nicolas Sarkozy, mayor of Neuilly and chief candidate on the list RPR-DL-GE, was 
faced with a difficult task. He took over the presidency of the RPR and the common list in 
mid-March 1999 after the resignation of Philippe Séguin. Séguin, deputy of the Vosges, had 
been chosen by President Chirac to head the Gaullist party in an effort to gather a single 
rightist list behind his presidential program. Séguin, a noted anti-European, had voted against 
the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Had the war in Kosovo and the NATO bombings on March 24, 
1999 not occurred, France would not have gotten involved in the war and Séguin’s European 
campaign could probably have been run without discussing purely European issues. Philippe 
Séguin had commented before the bombings that “In the European elections, talking about 
Europe is out” (Jarreau 1999, 13).
25 From the beginning of the war, Séguin criticized France’s 
war efforts and its president, leader of French foreign policy and supreme military 
commander. 
Unfortunately for Séguin, the war forced all the lists to take stances on a host of 
European issues. If Chirac, in appointing Séguin to head the Gaullist list, clearly did not want 
him to take anti-European stances, Chirac could not expect Séguin to take pro-European 
stances, either. Before the outbreak of the war this understanding remained workable, but it 
still constrained both Chirac’s and Séguin’s political activities. Although Séguin might have 
been able to attract anti-European voters from the extreme right and Pasqua’s and Villiers’s 
followers, Séguin’s open anti-Europeanism prevented Chirac from attracting pro-European 
voters who were shifting their support to Bayrou´s centrist and pro-European UDF. Had 
                                                 
25 “Aux européennes, parler de l’Europe est hors sujet.”  
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Séguin fully backed French military actions in Kosovo he might have stayed at the head of the 
Gaullist list. But for Séguin, backing French military action would have meant saying “yes” to 
cooperation with NATO and legitimizing intra-European military cooperation. He chose not 
to do so. In these changed political circumstances, the understanding between Chirac and 
Séguin came under growing pressure and, finally, broke down.  
Sarkozy’s political future was totally dependent on how well his list did. A supporter 
of Edouard Balladur, Chirac’s main opponent on the right in the presidential elections of 
1995, Sarkozy’s political task was to draw the split right together behind a presidential 
majority. “My ambition is not to end my days in the European Parliament. The President 
needs a strong Gaullist movement. That’s my mission” (Sauvage 1999, 7).
26 As the architect 
of Jacques Chirac’s European policy, Sarkozy would further Chirac’s re-election. Toward this 
goal, Sarkozy first attempted to create a common list with Alain Madelin’s DL and François 
Bayrou’s UDF. This plan failed, leaving the right in a state of total disarray on the eve of the 
elections. Sarkozy’s pathetic attempt to form a common list with Charles Pasqua was also 
doomed to failure from the beginning. For Pasqua, president of the regional council of the 
Hauts-de-Seine and general councillor of Neuilly, Sarkozy, mayor of Neuilly since 1983, was 
nothing but an opportunist. 
Tactically speaking, Sarkozy was trying to bring together the anti- and pro-European 
supporters of the RPR, the Europeanists of the UDF, and the sovereignists of the Pasqua-de 
Villiers list. The aim of uniting pro- and anti-Europeans was also visible in presidential 
rhetoric. Pro-European in his public appearances, Chirac was also vehemently nationalistic in 
his ambition to construct a Europe for France, a French Europe. In order to succeed in this 
                                                 
26 “Mon ambition n’est pas de finir mes jours au Parlement européen. Le président de 
la République a besoin de s’appuyer sur un mouvement gaulliste fort. Je suis porteur de 
cela.”   
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balancing act, Chirac and Sarkozy had to try to incorporate into their program both Bayrou’s 
openly federalist program and Pasqua’s ultranationalism. Indeed, Chirac’s main political 
concern since the 1970s had been to eliminate or at least diminish the power of both the 
center-rightist and the conservative wings of the right.  
In its official program, the RPR was for a Europe of nations and states rather than a 
federal Europe. Both the RPR and DL wanted to grant more powers to both the Commission 
and the Council, counterbalanced by an increase in the power of control of the national 
parliaments. They wanted to oppose the independence of the European Central Bank by 
strengthening the power of the large European Union countries and of the Euro 11, the 
committee composed of the ministers of finance of the countries in the Euro zone. In 
Sarkozy’s and Madelin’s view, enlargement of the European Union to the East had to be as 
swift as possible, integrating the new democracies into Europe, a dream of General de 
Gaulle’s. Demanding a reform of social security that would address retirement, 
unemployment, poverty, and exclusion, both were opposed to European taxes and to the 
increase in the European budget. Sarkozy and Madelin were in favor of reinforcing common 
European defense in the framework of the WEU and NATO and of developing a common 
European defense industry. 
In order to succeed, Sarkozy’s operation of uniting the right required the president’s 
full support. The problem was that the president, “supreme arbiter and above politics”
27 
according to the French Fifth Republic Constitution, was solicited by both Sarkozy and 
Bayrou. Publicly Chirac could give his support to neither; his backing of Sarkozy’s Gaullist 
list was more subtle. For instance, Sarkozy needed the support of other European politicians to 
challenge the Socialists, who were backed by the European Socialist Party. Although the RPR 
                                                 
27 “Arbitre suprême et extérieur aux jeux politiques.”  
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was not affiliated in the European Parliament with the European Popular Party (EPP), Chirac 
convinced Conservative Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar to meet with Sarkozy. 
Sarkozy had vowed that the RPR would join the ranks of the EPP in the European Parliament. 
To the great surprise of François Bayrou, president of the UDF, which was part of the EPP, 
Chirac personally called Aznar and asked him to see Sarkozy “as a favor”
28 (Le Canard 
enchaîné 1999, 2), which Aznar of course could not refuse him.  
What interests did the RPR-DL-GE list represent? Sarkozy and Madelin, leader of DL 
(the former Parti républicain, PR), took into account three general criteria in putting together 
their list of candidates. The first criteria was that no deputies could run, except the two chief 
candidates. Sarkozy and Madelin wanted to prevent the holding of a plurality of posts from 
being too blatant because it would have been harmful for their image as modernizing parties. 
The second criteria was that persons having served two terms in the European Parliament 
could not be candidates. This guaranteed the renewal of French representation in the European 
Parliament. Of the first 30 candidates on the list, three-fourths were new. The third criteria 
was gender parity, which had become a political must: half of the first 30 candidates were 
women, half men. All in all, of the 87 candidates, 48 were women and 39 men. Sarkozy was 
quick to capitalize on this, declaring that his list had more women candidates than Bayrou’s or 
Pasqua’s. Clearly the Gaullist chief candidate saw having women candidates as a condition for 
winning the elections. “We have gone beyond the requirements of parity. Like this, we can 
                                                 
28 “Comme un service.”  
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rest easy during the elections” (Grosjean 1999, 9).
29 The problem was finding the women, and 
Sarkozy was forced to list candidates such as Clara Gaymard (21
st position), the wife of a 
former State Secretary of Health.  
                                                 
29 “Nous avons été au-delà des impératifs de la parité. Comme ça, on sera tranquille 
pour les élections.” 
Apart from these general criteria Sarkozy and Madelin had to take into account the 
various currents in their respective parties. By appointing Sarkozy to follow Séguin as chief 
candidate of the RPR, Chirac secured the passive support of former Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur, a potential challenger on the right. Margie Sudre, number three on the list, was a 
former state secretary of Francophone relations and close to Chirac. Apart from being a 
woman, Sudre also represented the island of Réunion. Tenth and eighteenth on the list were 
Christine de Veyrac and Mylène Descanges, former assistants to former president of the UDF 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The presence of these candidates on the list in eligible positions 
attested to Sarkozy’s close relations with Giscard and to the former president’s willingness to 
“play his own game” and give his support to Chirac instead of backing Bayrou. The followers 
of Alan Juppé, former Prime Minister and mayor of Bordeaux, included Hugues Martin (15
th 
position), special advisor to Juppé, Yves Wervaerde (12
th position), Juppé’s former substitute 
in Paris, and Marie-Thérèse Hermange (9
th position): all had good chances of getting elected. 
The candidates behind Philippe Séguy, former Speaker of the National Assembly, included 
Serge Karoutchi (11
th position), deputy and president of the RPR at the regional council of the  
 
47
Île-de-France, and deputy Anne-Marie Schaffner (17
th position). One of Sarkozy’s candidates 
was regional councillor of Auvergne Brice Hortefeux (13
th position). Apart from Alain 
Madelin, deputy and mayor of Redon, two other candidates were former ministers in Juppé’s 
1995 government, Eric Raoult (RPR) and François Hostalier (DL) (Saux 1999). DL 
candidates included, apart from Madelin, MEP Françoise Grossetête (4
th position), MEP 
Thierry Jean-Pierre (6
th position), MEP Yves Wervaerde (12
th position), and Anne-Marie 
Schaffner (17
th position). All in all, of the 87 candidates on this list, 47 were members of the 
RPR, 29 of DL, and 3 of GE. Eight of the candidates were regional officials and 
“representatives of civil society”. 
On the center-right, the chief candidate of the UDF, François Bayrou, former Minister 
of Education in Edouard Balladur’s government, was openly federalist, vowing to take his 
seat in the European Parliament if elected. This was a clear sign of commitment for a public 
used to defection: as noted above chief candidates usually gave up their seats in the European 
Parliament shortly after having been elected. Without the war raging in Kosovo, the content of 
the debate over Europe in the elections would probably have been reduced to abstract internal 
quarrels over political Europe. As a consequence of the war, a real European agenda became 
possible. It made perfect sense, in this situation, for Bayrou to run his own independent UDF 
list instead of joining forces with other right-wing lists. Sarkozy and Madelin bargained for 
some time with Bayrou, who demanded fulfilment of three conditions to create a common list: 
support of European defense, a European constitution, and a European president.  
Since 1998, relations between the UDF and the RPR had been tumultuous. The 
“Alliance pour la France”, an umbrella organization created by the parties to further their 
common interests, had been a disappointment for Bayrou: the larger RPR seemed 
systematically to get a better deal. The UDF lost the presidency of the Senate in October 1998,  
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confronted the RPR and DL concerning the succession of Charles Millon to the presidency of 
the Rhône-Alpes regional council, and was faced with the “non negotiable” choice of Philippe 
Séguin as the head of the list for the European elections. The UDF’s campaign slogan was 
“Une Europe de la clarté.” In his program, Bayrou wanted to see a common European defense 
on the basis of the WEU, which would be integrated into the European Union. This 
intervention force would not supplant the national armies. Rather, it would be called in by the 
Council of Ministers voting by majority. Bayrou called bluntly for European defense, a 
European constitution, and the election of a European president who would “carry as much 
weigh on the world scene as the President of the United States does” (Le Monde 1999a, 7).
30 
A college composed of national and European parliamentarians would elect the European 
president by universal suffrage. Bayrou also defended a European tax that would replace the 
national contributions to the European Union budget.  
In putting together his list Bayrou had to take into account criteria similar to those 
Sarkozy-Madelin had to consider when they created the RPR-DL-GE list. On Bayrou’s list, 45 
of the 87 candidates were women. Of the first eleven candidates five were women, including 
such prominent politicians as future President of the European Parliament Nicole Fontaine 
(2
nd position) and Françoise de Veyrinas, a Minister in Alain Juppé’s first government, 10
th 
position. Like Sarkozy and Madelin, he also had problems finding women. Bayrou couldn’t 
avoid listing the wives of political supporters. Jeanne-Françoise Hutin, wife of François 
Hutin-Desgrées, publisher of Ouest-France, the largest French regional newspaper 
(circulation 800,000), was 17
th and municipal councillor Janelly Fourton, wife of the CEO of 
Rhône-Poulenc, was 7
th. According to the satirical weekly Le canard enchaîné, in response to 
Hutin’s candidature “Ouest-France gives particular attention to the appearances of the UDF 
                                                 
30 “Peser sur la scène du monde aussi lourd que le président des Etats-Unis.”  
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list” (Le canard enchaîné 1999b, 21).
31 Other well-known candidates included General 
Philippe Morillon (3
rd position), hero of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, Alain Lamassoure (4
th 
position), former Minister for European affairs in Edouard Balladur’s government, and 
Thierry Cornillet (8
th position), President of Parti Radical (PR) and mayor of Montélimar. 
                                                 
31  “Ouest-France accorde une place toute particulière aux manifestations de la liste 
UDF.”  
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In the anti-European camp, the CNPT list led by Jean Saint-Josse, regional councillor 
of Aquitaine and mayor of Corraze (Pyrénées-Atlantiques), was a clearly rural and regional 
anti-political list. Its budget was a modest FF 5.5 million compared to the Communist Party’s 
FF 40 million. Many of its candidates were former sportsmen, presidents of hunting 
associations, and individuals involved in the gun industry. Left behind in the wake of 
economic modernization, they fought against cultural uniformization and the power of the 
European technocrats. Anti-ecologist, they opposed the policies of Green Minister of the 
Environment Dominique Voynet, which they thought threatened traditional ways of life 
connected to hunting and fishing by forbidding, for instance, the night hunting of 
woodpigeons (palombes). According to Saint-Josse, Europe had to stay a Europe of 
differences, a space “where regional and national identities are recognized, where elected 
officials instead of technocrats make decisions” (Garcia 1999, 10).
32 
 
The election results 
 
The 1999 European parliament elections were held on Sunday June 13 in all 15 European 
Union countries. In France, the abstention rate reached a record high of 52.98 per cent. As in 
previous elections, the average French voter was an educated, middle-aged, upper middle 
class man interested in politics. The most attentive to European politics were farmers, 
managers, and members of the liberal professions. The highest rates of abstention were found 
among the young, women, manual workers and employees (Ysmal 1999, 6). According to 
Pierre Giacometti of the opinion polling organization IPSOS, the main reason for the high 
                                                 
32 “Où l’on reconnaîtra les identités des régions et des nations, où les élus décideront 
à la place des technocrates.”  
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level of abstentions was the absence of visible issues (Guiral 1999, 8). The electorate felt its 
vote would not change anything. The results were as follows: 
 
 
 
TABLE 3. Elections to the European Parliament, 1999 
 
List 
 
Percentage of votes 
 
Number of seats 
 
PS-MDC-PRG 
 
21.95 per cent 
 
22 
 
RPF 
 
13.05 per cent 
 
13 
 
RPR-DL-GE 
 
12.82 per cent 
 
12 
 
Greens 
 
9.72 per cent 
 
9 
 
UDF 
 
9.28 per cent 
 
9 
 
Communists 
 
6.78 per cent 
 
6 
 
CPNT 
 
6.77 per cent 
 
6 
 
FN 
 
5.69 per cent 
 
5 
 
LO-LCR 
 
5.18 per cent 
 
5 
Source: Ministère de l’intérieur, Libération June 15, 1999, 2. 
 
Apart from the lists of social movement lists such the unemployed that did not pass the 
threshold of 5 per cent, the losers in these elections were the extreme right, the Communists, 
and the RPR-DL-GE  list. The extreme right, once united behind their leader Le Pen, was now  
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divided into two fractions, Le Pen’s FN and Mégret’s MN. As a result, only Le Pen’s party 
got over 5 per cent of the votes and succeeded in getting 5 seats in the Parliament. The 
Communists, led by Robert Hue, stayed slightly under their goal of 6.8 per cent with 6.78 
percent of the votes (6 seats). Half of these seats went to various civil activists, including the 
former president of SOS-Racisme Fodé Sylla. Chirac’s presidential list led by Sarkozy did not 
succeed in attracting the votes of the more conservative electorate, which turned either to 
Pasqua’s and de Villier’s RPF or to the extreme right lists. As a result of the electoral failure 
of the Gaullists, the Socialists’ and Jospin’s positions were strengthened, whereas that of 
President Chirac was weakened. The three parties of the traditional right got around 35 
percent of the votes. On the left, the parties in power were the winners with about 39 percent 
of the votes.  
The surprise winners in the elections were Pasqua’s and de Villiers’s RPF, the Greens, 
and the CNPT. The Greens, led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, succeeded better than the 
Communists in attracting some of the passive voters. The hunters’ list, led by Jean Saint-
Josse, got 6.77 percent of the votes and 6 seats in the European Parliament. Not surprisingly, 
most of its supporters were in the rural areas of Southwest France. In some villages, up to 30 
percent of the votes cast went to the hunters. How can this success be explained? It was a 
protest vote against the established parties in elections perceived as being secondary. Many 
who had previously voted for Bayrou, president of the general council of the Pyrénées-
Atlantiques, had had enough of the quarrels between the leaders of the right and cast their 
ballot for “the hunters” as they were familiarly called. Others, feeling that the Green Minister 
of Environment, Dominique Voynet, was threatening the traditional rural way of life with the 
European Nature 2000 legislation, found in Saint-Josse’s program a defence of their rural 
interests and their patrimony. “Jean-Claude,” president of a local hunting association in Orion  
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(Pyrénées-Atlantique), justified his choice the following way: 
 
I voted against the Greens, I blame them for everything, they are anti-hunting, 
anti-rural, anti-everything. They are against the countryside. There is a general 
feeling of unease in the countryside, but the politicians don’t care, so this is the 
only way to get yourself heard. (Grosjean 1999, 9)
33 
 
                                                 
33 “J’ai voté contre les Verts, je leur reproche tout, ils sont antichasse, antiruralité, 
antitout. Voilà, ils sont contre la campagne. Il y a un malaise dans les campagnes, les 
politiques s’en foutent, alors c’est le seul moyen de se faire entendre.” 
Conclusions 
 
Social scientific research on globalization and regional integration has mainly concentrated on 
the economic and labor-related aspects of these processes, emphasizing their destructive 
consequences. Through a case study of the 1999 French elections to the European Parliament, 
I have attempted to show that Europeanization offers avenues for the modernization of 
political life. These elections provided an opportunity for political parties and anti-
establishment movements to empower voiceless groups and imagine a European future for 
France. For the first time in French political history, each list had an equal number of male 
and female candidates, a revolutionary occurrence in a country that, despite its self-image as  
 
54
the inventor of human rights, has lagged behind in all indicators relative to women in politics. 
For the first time, some lists such as the Communist party list included social activists of color 
who were not members of the PCF. In this way the Communists tried to bring into the 
political process voiceless groups such as France’s Muslims and the unemployed. For the first 
time, despite the fact that France was one of the originators of the European Communities in 
the 1950s, political parties had to elaborate a European dimension in issues such as defense 
policy, European taxation, and immigration. As a result of European regional integration, 
political parties and lists such as the regional “hunters” imagined their own Europe and, in the 
process, challenged the official “French Europe” elaborated by government and president. The 
candidates to the European Parliament constructed an alternative Europe to the one presented 
by official discourse that concentrates on a unified, Republican France: a Europe where non-
Christians, the unemployed, women, and regional representatives would also have a public 
voice. In these ways, the elections contributed to a modernization of French politics. 
Not only has European political integration provided marginal groups in France with 
an access to national politics through European Parliament elections, it has also supplied the 
government and the presidency with new resources, connecting them to trans-European circles 
and networks that are developing their own political culture. The success of neoliberal 
economic doctrines in the European Union may have in part to do with these networks. 
National ministers spend half their time wrestling with European affairs in the Council of 
Ministers of the European Union and in transnational party structures, developing a common 
culture and outlook on politics and economics. The main ingredients for this Weltanschauung 
are well known: electoral cycles should not interfere with economic policy and unemployment 
figures should not have priority over other monetary indices in the evaluation of economic and 
political success.  
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